The anti-terrorist war: what lies beneath the concept?

THE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR: What Lies Beneath the Concept?

THE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR:

What Lies Beneath the Concept?

Terrorism is a complex, polymorphous phenomenon, which becomes increasingly important within the globalized world we are living in through its immediate and long-term consequences. The most important aspect of it is the threat to use or the deliberate use of violence in order to induce fear, panic, terror and thus achieve various interests and goals political, ideological, religious or financial in nature. The terrorist phenomenon consists the ensemble of violent acts that are committed by terrorist organizations structured as rational actors with clearly defined interests, goals, methods and attack capabilities in order to create a climate of insecurity and thus achieve its goals through manipulation of the public opinion and pressure of different enemy governments.

The main problem of the world today is concepts, incomplete, ambiguous concepts. Terrorism is one such concept. And the lack of clear definition of this concept, leads to its misinterpretation, which may have serious consequences on the perception of the present situation within the international system.

The anti-terrorist war is a war against international Islamic terrorism, against the global terrorist network, identified with Al Qaida itself. Therefore, this war is not total, nor is it global. It is based on action-reaction type of engagement and it relates to the confrontation for power and hegemonic influence at regional or local levels.

Not long ago we watched the news about terrorist attacks around the world on TV and we thanked God for having spared us of such deadly menace. But that is no longer the case. This war is upon us whether we want it or not. It is slowly drawing closer to our homes and questions begin to rise about whether we are really prepared to deal with this enemy or not. And if so, by what means? What becomes of security in the face of such deadly force? In the light of the 9.11 terrorist attacks the international community have woken up to a world of unprecedented violence and organized crime which affects their security and even the values they stand for. This threat required rapid adaptation and response. A worldwide awareness of the existence and the danger this phenomenon posed to our societies was formed and countermeasures began to be formulated. The West has embarked upon a total war against terrorism, aiming at destroying it completely and permanently along with those regimes that foster it. But questions still remain unanswered. Who is it that we are fighting against? What is our perception of the enemy? Are we prepared to fight this kind of enemy? What strategies do we use? And most importantly, how far do we go? How much are we willing to sacrifice to win this war? Can this war ever be won in the classical sense of the word? Given the fact that this is not a usual traditional military threat we are facing, does this mean the army will have a new role for in the future? How does the state provide security in the face of such an enemy? And what does security really mean in this context?

As I looked for answers to these questions, I have come to understand that we are witnessing a historical change, not only in the way wars are fought, but in the way the opponents are conceived, in the strategies they use and the motivations they act upon. It seems to me this subject is of greatest importance nowadays and it must be deeply understood by each and every one of us. This is the reason why I chose it for this paper, hoping that I shall have but a small contribution to its understanding.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to be fought; its novelty resides in its arrival upon the international scene and its redefinition as an international actor. My main argument is that today, in the context of the anti-terrorist campaign, we are dealing with a misperception of the enemy, that comes from a deeper lack of clear definition of the terrorist phenomenon and its understanding as a complex polymorphous phenomenon, with multiple directions of evolution and activity – each particular and different in its own way.

Second, this lack of clear definition of the terrorist phenomenon could lead the anti-terrorist coalition in two wrong directions. On the one hand, it could cause them to limit their perception of the enemy and thus fight only one arm of the terrorist octopus. This is a clear example of the U.S anti-terrorist war pointed at destroying Al Qaida as their main enemy and capturing its most important members. From this point of view the emphasis is on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and not on terrorism in general. On the other hand, it could cause them to have too broad a perception of their enemy – i.e. the terrorist phenomenon itself. This is an example of the specified goal of the anti-terrorist campaign and the anti-terrorist coalition, i.e. to eradicate terrorism completely and permanently. In both cases complete and permanent victory is not possible and the lack of clear definition of one’s enemy leads to a misdirection of the campaign.

Third, in the face of this threat, the Western societies’ task is twofold. On the one hand, they have to try to make the world safe again (I mean, of course, as safe as possible or as safe as it was before the 9.11 attacks). And on the other hand, they have to maintain their openness, and not limit the liberties that define them as democratic societies.

And fourth, the current “Bush Doctrine”[1] although much more drastic and less tolerant is not a major deviation from the general U.S foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR It is much more radical and interventionist in a massive retaliation[2] sense of the word. And this comes particularly from the position the U.S assumes in the international system: the superpower or the hegemonic power if you will. But the effects are much more important for these reactions or countermeasures against terrorism announce the strengthening of state authority and thus of the nation state itself, along with regional or transnational structures and organizations. The flagrant limitation of civil liberties and rights and their descendance upon a secondary position in favor of security reflects a general idea that for the time being states value security and prefer it over their openness. These effects are severe because they delegitimize the democratic state and its government. And last but not least, they are severe for they are being imported into other countries too, like France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and so on.

In the end, I do not wish to say that the anti-terrorist war is one that cannot be won, but rather that victory, whatever it may look like, it cannot complete, nor can it be permanent. And the chances we have for victory are diminishing every day now, for our own system is turning against us.

But before I move forward to debating the issues at hand, I consider proper a closer look at the terrorist phenomenon whose understanding is crucial to this analysis.

1.     Terrorism and the problem of defining the meaning of concepts

First of all we should ask ourselves: what is terrorism? As I looked for an answer to this question I was surprised not to be able to find any clear definition of the concept, due to the lack of consensus among academics in this respect. Most authors take a unilateral view and present terrorism from a single angle whereas others list more meanings of the same term but cannot seem to be able to choose the most relevant or important one.[3] Most authors emphasize the operational dimension of terrorism, which is essentially a particular type of action. Wilkinson, for example, defines terrorism as an attempt (essentially an action) by a person, group or state to impose political, national, social or religious aims by killing not only soldiers but also innocent civilians too.[4]

I must say I find this approach to terrorism narrow, confined and restrictive, for it is stranded upon one side of the issue, practically ignoring or refusing to see the bigger picture. Although there really is a fundamental operational dimension to terrorism, it is not the only one, nor could it exist separated from the others: an ideological basis, a propaganda dimension, a resource or financing dimension, a social dimension, a rational, logistic dimension and a religious, national, or political dimension that varies from one organization to another in relation to the ideological basis.[5] In the end, I believe these characteristics make terrorism what it is and not vice versa. Trying to establish a hierarchy between these components is a rather useless attempt as they are so closely entwined that their separate understanding would necessarily destroy the whole puzzle or at least distort the picture significantly.

It is my belief that terrorism is an “umbrella term”[6] that embraces a large range of organizations, pursuing relatively different goals, of different nature, that operate through actions particularly oriented towards an identified enemy – the state, some other hostile states, national or religious groups, etc. The main reason why is so broadly used, though, is that it facilitates communication. But still, this doesn’t bring us any closer to understanding what terrorism is. So I invite you to bear with me as I seek to discover the general characteristics of terrorism.

What is terrorism? General guidelines.

Terrorism is not a newborn phenomenon. Quite the contrary; it has been around for a long time. Some authors consider it to have existed from the beginning of time.[7] However, I consider these opinions to be vague and at the same time to produce a lot of confusion over the concept. This is one of the reasons that have led me to believe that terrorism is a product of contemporary modern nation state behaviour.[8] Terrorism is thus a kind of behavioral phenomenon, real and important especially through its manifest behavioral consequences. It is, however, directly generated by the state – as in the case of state terrorism – or indirectly inflicted by it – as in the case of secessionist, ethnic or religion-based terrorism. Authors that sustain this argument[9] relate modern terrorism to the early stages of the Cold War and its evolution as an efficient instrument of the great powers that also soon became available to other nations, too. This is mostly why these authors see terrorism as an evolving phenomenon that incorporates two or three stages: traditional, classic terrorism, neoterrorism and eventually a transition period among the two.

As I have already mentioned earlier, terrorism in its modern operational form, and in the modern sense of the word, is a product of state behaviour during the Cold War period (early 1950s). Consequently, it is generally associated with state terrorism that aimed at imposing terror, insurgence, and rebellion as a means of achieving higher political goals. Its mechanism rested upon imposing terror, panic, and a shared sense of insecurity to a targeted population and on the pressure its social impact put on the respective government to comply with terrorists’ demands. And as long as these were complied with properly, security was easily reinstalled and the threat faded away or possibly even disappeared. For over four decades of Cold War, many terrorist groups,[10] harbored and financed by states or political parties within the respective states operated through assassinations, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and so on, choosing rather single targets at a time (that were usually represented by high-rank officials, decision-makers). Consequently, the number of terrorist attacks and their frequency was low, but increased progressively in the years to come[11] and so did the number of casualties. This type of terrorism was highly organizational, insurgent, sponsored, politically oriented and endemic. [12]

However, much has changed from that point on. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR saw the dawn of a new era, in which Western democracy was unchallenged. There was no need, and no place for terrorism in this world. Consequently, terrorist organizations all of a sudden found themselves abandoned by their protectors. Therefore, they underwent a long period of structural and substantial change, a period of transition from state terrorism, to anti-state terrorism. During this period, one of the most important transformations was the change in tactics and in the principle of choosing targets. Now were engaged as targets mostly civilians, public places and institutions. At the same time, terrorist organizations developed an anti-state dimension, hostile attitude.[13] The main immediate goal continued to be defined as imposing terror, creating panic and a shared sense of insecurity among a targeted population, by means of contagion (people would put themselves or possibly their families and friends in the place of the victims of a terrorist attack, and thus the social impact of terrorism would be significantly greater). Moreover, the social impact increased as terrorist organizations adopted new, highly destructive weapons.[14] Terrorists sought to produce as many material and human damage as possible. The very conception of weapons has developed and modern 21^st century terrorist organizations began using a various range of weapons. Public places, institutions, buildings, and so on became weapons themselves in the hands of terrorists – or else what could flying a jet into a tower mean?! However, this does not mean that terrorist organizations no longer use conventional weapons. Quite the contrary the choice of weapons has diversified a lot in the past 10 years. The bomb – with its multiple uses – remains the weapon of choice, but other weapons are used too –machineguns, pistols, grenades, missile-launchers, etc. Marret divided terrorism into two main categories depending on the type of explosives it uses: transnational terrorism which requires specially trained personnel, and acts in the name of an ideology, by using sophisticated explosives (usually built by its own members); and local or domestic terrorism, take can take many shapes, but always uses improvised explosive devices.[15] This separation is highly relevant for this analysis, for it helps us identify the enemy within the “enemy.”[16] However, there is an even more important aspect related to weapons – the use of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biologica and nuclear weapons; everything from viruses, toxic or poisonous gases to neurotoxic agents is used[17]).

Terrorist groups are limited in their purchase of weapons only by their limited financial resources. After the end of the Cold war, these organizations no longer received support from states, or if they did, it was clearly not enough. So they had to develop their own ways to raise money for weapons and for financing their attacks. This form of rational, pragmatic self-financing mechanism led to a higher degree of autonomy and independence of terrorist organizations which them more unpredictable and less vulnerable. This is how the so-called associated phenomena of terrorism appeared. Nowadays, terrorist organizations dispose of a highly sophisticated infrastructure that combines state financial support with organized and well-developed cross-border criminality (drug traffic, weapons, mass destruction weapons or forbidden materials traffic, human beings traffic, illegal immigration, laundering money, etc) and the opportunities offered by the capitalist market (through ghost-companies or shareholding in legal companies, NGOs, banking system, and so on).[18] However, I do not agree with this perspective that presents such phenomena as being associated to terrorism. I do not agree with Marret in this respect. I believe these phenomena have grown to be organically part of the terrorist organizations and consequently a part of the complex terrorist phenomenon. Without them, terrorist organizations would not be able to raise the necessary funds to finance their activities; thus they could not activate anymore.

As for the targets, they are as diverse as they come. The emphasis is on public, vulnerable and crowded places, buildings, etc, because terrorist organizations seek to produce as much human and material damage as possible. State symbols, administrative buildings, public institutions are always targeted. Especially since terrorism is so highly symbolic (uses symbols to send its message).

Although many things have changed, one things remains the same about terrorism: the methods; the have not changed at all. Terrorist organizations use assassination, bombing, kidnapping, hijacking planes, etc from the very beginning. There is a rational, logic pattern, a ritual in planning and carrying out every attack from this point of view. Although, some terrorist organizations may prefer certain weapons and methods over others does not, but they always adapt them the target and seek new ingenious ways to use them because achieving to surprise the enemy is sometimes vital for the success of the attack.

With so many possible targets though, the state’s job doesn’t get any easier. “Attention becomes the scarce resource” and information credibility becomes “the crucial resource”, thus leading to a greater emphasis upon “the ability to filter information.”[19]

This brings me to one of the most important components of terrorism as a global phenomenon: the ideological foundation. Ideology[20] constitutes an important part of any terrorist organization and inherently of all its actions. How? Because it is the element which helps legitimize the group’s actions. Moreover, it plays a key role in keeping the organization united and gives its members a sense of purpose and solidarity. Ideology represents the basis for construction of motivations and arguments in favor of terrorist action against the enemy. For example, Al Qaida has developed specific means of motivating its actions based upon the idea that nobody is innocent, not even civilians are. They argue, civilians are not innocent, nor could they ever be in a democratic system, since they allow their governments to act as they do towards the Muslim countries: constantly violate their right to self-determination, steals precious resources from them and corrupts their governments and societies; its troops are constantly present in the region, as occupation, colonial forces. They are not obliged to accept these unfair actions of their governments and they have the power to remove them from office anytime. But since they do not, they are equally responsible, so they are not innocent – they are indirectly guilty for this state of affairs. Therefore, killing civilians is neither immoral, nor unjustified from this point of view. Terrorists do not declare themselves as enemies of the government, but as enemies of the state and of the people.[21] They accuse Western democratic societies of duble standards and values, of imperialism and racism: “Let us not forget one of your major characteristics: your duality in both manners and values; your hypocrisy in manners and principles. All manners, principles and values have two scales: one for you and one for the others. The freedom and democracy that you call to is for yourselves and for white race only; as for the rest of the world, you impose upon them your monstrous, destructive policies and Governments, which you call the 'American friends'. Yet you prevent them from establishing democracies. When the Islamic party in Algeria wanted to practice democracy and they won the election, you unleashed your agents in the Algerian army onto them, and to attack them with tanks and guns, to imprison them and torture them – a new lesson from the 'American book of democracy!!!”[22] Moreover, Western society is spiritually empty, laic, it has lost all respect for values, morals, principles, and religion… “It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind: […] You separate religion from your policies, contradicting the pure nature, which affirms Absolute Authority to the Lord and your Creator.”[23] Thus they call the Western societies to convert to Islam and accept the true faith and the true God: “The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.”[24] This confers them enough motivation, since it is highly unlikely that this sort of request will be complied with. Second, they use threats as means of deterrence and for their social impact.[25] This kind of arguments forces us to rationalize within a closed vicious circle that we cannot break without delegitimizing our own system and proving their theories right. And this mainly the way by which terrorist organizations refuse to take responsibility for the killings or the damages they cause. Since no one is completely innocent, they cannot be blamed for setting the record straight.

Some authors associate the ideological foundation of terrorism with religion[26], which usually is considered to be Islam, although it is not the only one. However, I consider this approach to be restrictive and narrow for four main reasons.

First, this approach is only interested in Islamic terrorism, which is but a species of terrorism. Other well-known terrorist groups like IRA or ETA have nothing to do with Islam or any other religion for that matter.

Second, religion is used as a basis for legitimization, not as an ideology in itself – although at times the ideology may bear the scares of religion.[27] Religion is basically the one that provides terrorist organizations with their support for taking action against their declared enemies[28], because, after all, who dares defy Allah?! Moreover, this means of legitimating does not need to be explained and has a universal claim.[29] In the name of religion and of one’s beliefs, no sacrifice is big enough.

Third, this is not religion in its sacred understanding, but rather a “falsified version” of religion, that is an interpretation of religious norms and dogma in order to fit the general picture and to offer legitimization to the respective goals and actions that are preached by the terrorist organizations.[30] In the end, religion is not properly an ideology in the hands of terrorist groups, but rather a weapon, or a tool if you will. Zachary Karabell, for instance, illustrates the idea that identifying terrorism with Islamic fundamentalism[31] is essentially wrong, for fundamentalism should be seen as a “cultural phenomenon.”[32] It is necessary that the distinction between fundamentalism as a cultural phenomenon and extremism (which is only a part of fundamentalism) be made; under these circumstances, he argues, only extremism alone is the true security threat, and only the spread of extremism is to be contained. Other authors, such as P. Wilkinson, argue that extremism and fundamentalism cannot be separates from one another; they are basically the same thing. Therefore, one should take action against fundamentalism itself and its spread within the other Islamic countries.[33] Although, both quoted authors argue that fundamentalism is a religion-inspired ideology, “explicitly hostile to the West, and to the United States in particular”[34], their understanding of the terrorist phenomenon in relation to it is significantly different. The first identifies terrorism with extremism (a radical form of Islamic fundamentalism)[35], while the latter refers to terrorism as a being a product of Islamic fundamentalism (from which necessarily follows that Islam itself is a terrorism generating culture). It is my belief that none of them is entirely right. First of all, because even though terrorism is indeed a form of extremism, it is far from being defined this way alone and a definition that should follow these lines is bound to be restrictive and incomplete. Second, because Islam is not a terrorism-generating culture, and I consider such an approach to be discriminating. I do not analyze the opposition between the West and terrorist organizations in terms of a clash of civilizations[36] or a religious war[37]. And the reason why I do not see it trough this perspective is that I do not really believe terrorism is a product of religion, nor is it based on religion. I believe religion is used only as a means of legitimating their activity and maintaining a sense of solidarity and common purpose, for it has great social impact. Islam is not a religion or a type of culture that generates terrorism, but it is a culture that is highly permissive of violence. The Quran may not be a “manual of terrorists”, but it serves them well as a guide in how to disguise their actions and social, financial and political interests behind a fake religious mask. However this is all it is, a mask. This confrontation is not a clash of civilizations or religions, but rather a confrontation between modern democratic, laic, secularized society (the Western society) and a religious, authoritarian, coercitive society (Islam).[38]

And last but not least, I do not believe that terrorist organizations define their goals in terms of religion. If you will just allow me to remind you, I understand ideology in terms of interests and aspirations (goals, that is). I do not consider the two dimensions to be completely separate and distinct[39], but their connections are rather shallow – which does not mean they are not efficient. They are linked, but not the similar. From this point of view I argue that the ideological dimension and the religious or national/political dimensions are different. And this point is best proved by the example of such terrorist organizations as ETA, IRA, PKK, ANC, or UPK, etc. These organizations have or have had a laic nationalist ideology that aimed at the construction of a new, nation-state; moreover, most of these organizations rested upon socialist, marxist-Leninist, trotskian ideas,[40] etc. It seems to me that the fundamental goals of terrorist organizations of both kinds are more political in nature. Moreover, they are a solution to the acknowledged root-causes of terrorist action. For example, in his “Letter to the American People”, Bin Laden identifies the main goals: “We want our land to be freed of the enemies, we want our land to be free of the Americans. We are demanding a right given to all living creatures […] Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple: (1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us […] There was an attack on the countries of Islam. And then the aggression continued with the Crusader-Jewish alliance being led by the United States and Israel […] We seek to instigate the nation to get up and liberate its land, to fight for the sake of God, and to make the Islamic law the highest law, and the word of God the highest word of all.”[41] This is where the “need to boycott the US goods and to attack the US forces and the US economy”[42] comes from. “This was a phenomenon that was considered healthy by all those opposing occupation and colonialism […] They diverted their attention from fighting a non-Muslim foreign occupier to an attempt to topple regimes in Arab and Islamic states, which they did not consider sufficiently Islamic.”[43] Although the goals that Al Qaida sets for itself are far more diverse, I believe that they can be grouped in three categories: the right to self-determination and self-governance (without the interference of Western powers, especially by the U.S); the discontinuation of American military presence in the region (on holy Arab soil);[44] and the immediate stop of the influence which American government has over corrupt, illegitimate domestic governments.[45]

Consequently, the root-causes of Islamic terrorism (the emphasis is here on the Middle East especially, since not all-Islamic groups identify them as its main problems to solve) are organically linked to two main directions. On the one hand, is the continued presence of American troops in the region and the American corrupting influence upon domestic governments? And on the other hand is the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian problem – which soon transformed into a whole Israeli-Arab problem, which is now being fueled by the intense arms race that is in progress right now in this part of the world.[46] These have caused them to develop an acute sentiment of frustration[47] and rebellion against an order laid-out by the very people they perceived as their enemies. Therefore, a sentiment of victimization[48] developed within these communities, affecting their self-perception and the perception of the outside world. “With the creation of Israel and the end of European colonialism, the peoples of the Middle East became that much more disillusioned with the West and, subsequently, with the leader of the West, the United States. America, in turn, came to see the Middle East as a strategic interest because of the oil and as a perilous trap because of conflicts between Arab nations and Israel.”[49] This is how Islam’s hostile attitude towards the West and towards Western values in general came to be. Islamic societies do not oppose reform, quite the contrary; what they oppose is the Western democratic reform process. Thus, one can conclude that terrorist organizations are anti-democratic.[50] Their ideology, as we have already see, is authoritarian, theocratic, repressive, and makes use of coercion.

Other authors consider terrorism as the result of “overpopulation, disease, scarcity of resources, refugee migration, increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders.”[51] In other words, terrorism could be originated at least partially in the low quality of poor government in the Middle East, as well as in the inequality and disparity in the distribution of resources and wealth among the states of the international system; terrorism derives directly from poverty, overpopulation and uneven economic globalization. On the contrary, some authors are too quick in dismissing them and considering them to be obviously wrong assumptions.[52] However, these are valid only for a limited number of cases, and they manifest themselves differently in different parts of the world (e.g. in the Middle East and in Africa, in Spain, Ireland or the Philippines these variables do not have the same effect upon terrorist organizations).[53] This is the reason why I prefer to consider them as variables or conditions that favor the existence and the maintenance of terrorism within a certain region, but whose action is merely relative.

Thus, not only its ideologic, religious/political, financial intrinsic dimensions shape a terrorist organization, but its shape also depends on the field in which it activates. Consequently, a regional or merely local group has a different internal organization than that of a terrorist group that operates in different parts of the world simultaneously. In this context, Marret’s classification comes into mind, and the difference between transnational terrorist organizations and local (domestic) ones. Moreover, terrorist organizations have different internal structures, depending on the category they fall into: classically structured organizations[54] or informal organizations,[55] also known as networks.[56] This differentiation is important because it offers a large quantity of information about the organizations it describes, about their goals and last but not least, about the main directions in which terrorist organizations around the world are likely to evolve in the next century. But probably the most important aspect of this classification rests in the fact that it offers crucial information in the matter this analysis has set off to investigate, i.e. who or what is the anti-terrorist campaign directed at.

As I was saying, not all terrorist groups are internally organized along the same guiding lines; much depends on the field and territory in which they activate. However, they all do have the same structure of members. All terrorist organizations are socially organized in three types of members. First are the active members who basically form the core of any terrorist organization and who have the greatest responsibility in planning the activities and in carrying them out. Next is the militants who offer logistic support for the active members and are in charge of security, locations for their training camps, food supplies and so on. And finally are the followers, who have various degrees of involvement, usually they only participate partially or inconsistently; they are more like a social basis for recruitment and logistic support.[57]

But other that its categories of members and they way they are structure, terrorist organizations usually differ a lot when it comes to their internal structure. And I have already identified two major types of structure they can adopt. However, they are not stable categories, but rather the two pole of a continuum, meaning the between these two types of internal organization terrorist groups can choose the one that is the most appropriate for themselves.

Terrorist organizations such as IRA or ETA, for example, fall into the first category – classically organized groups, with a rigid pyramidal structure (very similar to classic military hierarchies). They are organized in relatively small cells, active-duty units[58] or commandos.[59] These in turn are hierarchically organized on different levels with different degrees of responsibility and with different decision-making privileges; this type of rigid pyramidal structure follows precise organizational principles and norms. This pyramidal structure allows good communication between different levels of the hierarchical structure, as well as rapid transmission of the important decisions within the organization. However, at the same time this type of organization renders the terrorist group visible and vulnerable to police or military investigations. On the other hand, one of the main shortcomings of this type of organization is the fact that the cells cannot act on their own, they are highly dependent on the high command structures. Everything from choosing the targets, the weapons, the methods, the timing, to planning the attack and even carrying it out is dictated by these high-rank decision-makers within the organization. This leaves little maneuvering space to the operational cells that act on command and follow direct orders, without being able to set a strategy for themselves. And this makes the organization more fragile, more vulnerable, easier to track down and destroy, and less capable of adaptation and enduring. Usually, these organizations are easily destroyed by arresting their leaders, or the most important one of them anyway, because this paralyzes the whole activity of the group, from finance, to recruitment, to attack; there are many examples of such terrorist organizations that have not been able to survive when having been confronted with a succession crisis, after their leaders had been arrested of killed.[60] ETA commandos, for example, depend on their leaders for every step of an attack and the arrest of such a leader could delay and attack or possibly prevent it; moreover, it could make the other members vulnerable. IRA is more or less in the same situation.[61]

The other major type of internal organization is the network or informal organization.[62] They have a completely different principle of organization, a different territorial structure and a different operational framework.[63] The most frequently used example when talking about this type of organization is Al Qaida that becomes a reference-point for other terrorist organizations around the world. Al Qaida has a horizontal structure rather than a vertical pyramidal hierarchy, meaning it is not necessary a unitary, one-corpus organization, but rather a network of small cells that act upon a common interest, against common enemies and in relatively similar ways, under the umbrella of a common name – Al Qaida. It is actually believed that its internal organization follows the principles of dr. Adbullah Hazzan, an important Afghani university professor, who recommends the creation of an Islamic global network that can operate through cooperation and bi-lateral or multi-lateral collaboration among Islamic terrorist organizations.[64] Al Qaida indeed operates on the basis of high autonomy and independence of its cells in different steps of the decision-making process (from choosing the target to carrying out the attack), but at times these cells can receive recommendations on which targets to engage or specific directions to engage on a certain target and guide-lines for conducting the attack. High autonomy of the terrorist cells means simply a high degree of decentralization of the decision-making process, which is far from being complete. These cells are never completely independent, but they are rather configured as autonomous satellites revolving around each other; there is a certain level of interdependency between these satellites that have a high level of flexibility. This flexibility of its internal structure makes the organization highly adaptable to any kind of environment and more enduring for its activity does not depend on one or more leaders. Even if one cells is discovered and destroyed, there are still tens, possibly hundreds of other cells that carry out their agendas without being affected by the loss of one cell. This flexibility and large number of cells also makes the organization compatible with a global reach and the capacity to project their attacks anywhere in the world, especially if one considers the fact that these cells cooperate among themselves or with other organizations, only temporarily and on single, punctual matters of common interests. This is the reason why these cells are considered to be non-territorial.[65] On the other hand, this does not mean that within the organization does not exist any kind of hierarchy. There is always a sort of hierarchy, even if it is mostly informal and spontaneous. Besides, the very structure of this kind of organization is compatible with multiple leaders.[66] However, this is essentially different from the fact that this type of organization is compatible with collective leadership.[67] Thus the leader or the person known as the leader of an organization can hold only a symbolic position, that gives all the decentralized cells a sense of unity. He is sometimes identified with the spokesman of the respective organization, like in Al Qaida’s case.[68] This kind of leadership structure, makes the organization more enduring because all of a sudden is not enough to arrest a few leaders to bring down the entire organization. This is due to another extremely important principle that structures Al Qaida – the interchangeability of people within the organization.[69] No one is indispensable; no one is vital to the organization. Everybody can be replaced at any time. Thus, Al Qaida is shaped like a “hydra-headed network”[70] that is mostly oriented towards building transnational connections and partners as “force multipliers.”[71]

These kind of internal structures make the terrorist organizations much more invisible and thus much more secure from police and military investigations. Besides, its territorial dispersion makes it more difficult to combat since it requires the conjugated efforts of several states.

Academics and journalists have been quick to notice this difference[72] and some have associated it with transnational or international terrorism. In this context they emphasized two aspects of this kind of terrorism: modernization and propaganda. First, modernization[73] broadly refers to every single transformation that has affected terrorist organizations around the world. But it is mostly associated with the changes in weapons, strategies, and structures that have been investigated above and last but not least with communications. Nowadays terrorist organizations are taking to the Internet. The large quantity of information available on the Internet and the large number of frequent users determined them to seek to exploit this new resource. As Keohane and Nye put it, “the Internet not only focuses attention, but helps coordinate actions across boarders. Interactivity at low costs allows for the development of new virtual communities: people […] as part of a single group regardless of how far apart they are physically from one another.”[74] Moreover, the ability to disseminate free information “increases the potential for persuasion […], influences the beliefs of people […]. Nongovernmental actors have much greater opportunities to organize and propagate their views.”[75] This represents a new direction in the development and expansion of terrorist organizations around the world. Not only does it helps different cells keep in touch with each other permanently, but it also offers a great number of opportunities for recruiting new members.

Also, the communications aspect should be seen in relation to propaganda. What I mean is that terrorist organizations need to permanently recruit new members for their cells. This is essential to their survival. This is why they need to make their goals and ideology known to as wider a public as possible. And this is where propaganda comes in. It works in two directions: it legitimizes the organization, by building it a reputation and credibility (which are to be sustained by facts, i.e. attacks, victories against the enemy); and second it delegitimizes the enemy by ruining its credibility.[76] Propaganda works through the power of free information – on the Internet, on TV, on the radio, in the newspaper, everywhere. Mass media has a very important role to play in this confrontation. As I was saying earlier, any terrorist organization’s prime goal is to create panic, terror, and a shared sense of insecurity through contagion among a targeted population. Free information works, in case of terrorism, as a propagator of its message and simultaneously as an agent that induces panic and terror. Nowadays, the role of media is increasingly important from this point of view. Terrorists know that they can rely on news agencies to run a story about a terrorist attack on the air and this already a success. Take, for example, the 9.11 attacks in New York and Washington. I watched the two towers collapsing on TV, live, as I am sure most of you have too, and that produced such a strong impact on me. The impact that particular event had on the international community been mostly due to the fact that everybody physically witnessed it live on TV. (What better ways to affirm your position as global contender of the US than this – proving live to everybody that you can challenge the undisputed hegemonic power of the international system itself?) No one can remain indiferent to such a powerful compelling stimulus. “Propaganda as a type of free information is not new.”[77] Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida depend on mass media to propagate their message to the whole world. “The issue is not only which actors own television networks, radio stations and web sites […] but who pays attention to what fountains of information…”[78] Television and newspapers influence public opinion in a very high degree; this is why it is important to exploit this resource to the fullest. And this is the reason why many terrorist organizations are linked to television or radio stations, to newspapers or Internet news agencies.[79] In this context, terrorists say, mass media becomes an “amplifier of terrorism.”[80] Although I agree that mass media unwillingly (most of the time) helps spread the violent message of terrorist organizations, I believe the issue at hand here is misinterpreted. Mass media through its interest in particular events and conflicts presents them as security threats and possibly even affect the political decision-making process to take countermeasures against them. It is not the media that necessarily creates this premise for terrorism to spread its message, but globalization. The incredible flexibility and mobility of terrorist cells today is due to globalization.[81] They communicate faster on the Internet, they benefit from the liberties democratic systems offer their citizens, they benefit from the free capitalist market… in the end, globalization also works in their advantage. How good or bad its effects are, and what it is to be done about it will be discussed in the second chapter.

These are the main reasons why today we consider terrorism to be a serious and urgent security problem. We consider it barbarian, violent, intolerable and irrational.[82] I could agree on the first three, but irrational??? It seems to me as though we haven’t looked long enough at this phenomenon. Everything from its internal organization to selection of members, to developing new means of finance, to attack planning is conducted in the most rational manner. Absorbed by the religious aspect of this phenomenon and consumed with its violence we fail to notice that terrorism is not just any type of religious extremist violent outburst. Terrorist organizations do not act as spontaneously and unpredictably as religious fanatics do. There is an inherent ritualistic aspect[83] of terrorism, which is usually neglected. There are certain steps that are necessarily followed, especially in planning the attack, which has led many analysts to believe that there is military strategy and methods of attack in these terrorist attacks. These people are trained in the art of war; they know how to build a bomb and how to best plan an attack as to maximize its chances of success as well as their security conditions.[84] On the other hand, there is another aspect that we usually overlook. Terrorism is not about religion, at least primarily; it is about power[85] – political, social, financial, territorial, you name it! Terrorist organizations, as any other rational actor, seek to maximize their power over a society, country or region, with all the consequences that follow, as well as to maintain its security, its safety from outside statal actors.[86] For example, terrorist organizations reward their members with special fees monthly or annually, as well as with special fees that should launch the activity of a new-formed cell. Terrorists that get killed in suicidal attacks are always promised a fee (that sometimes reaches $ 50,000) which is to be cashed by their remaining families. And in addition, they are always assisted financially when in need, by other cells or the high command of the respective organization.[87] This argument has led Marret to believe that terrorism could be defined as a job, a profession, like any other profession.[88]

A difficult answer to a simple question

Although this paper’s main objective is not to define terrorism, I believe that I should at least briefly characterize it so that the reader could have a clearer vision of what I mean by it. This is extremely important especially since I am trying to establish the nature of the anti-terrorist campaign and a more specific characterization of the enemy it opposes. So, in the end, what is terrorism?

By terrorism I understand a complex, polymorphous phenomenon, which becomes increasingly important within the globalized world we are living in through its immediate and long-term consequences. The term terrorism is a broad concept, which incorporates a variety of activities and manifestations, criminal and illegal in essence. The most important aspect of it is the threat to use or the deliberate use of violence in order to induce fear, panic, terror and thus achieve various interests and goals political, ideological, religious or financial in nature. But one should keep in mind the fact that terrorism also includes cross-border criminality, in the many shapes it manifests itself. The terrorist phenomenon consists the ensemble of violent acts that are committed by terrorist organizations[89] structured as rational actors with clearly defined interests, goals, methods and attack capabilities in order to create a climate of insecurity and thus achieve its goals through manipulation of the public opinion and pressure of different enemy governments. It is symbolist, and seeks to provoke considerable damage, whether material or human. It has an anti-state orientation, whether it is local or transnational (or international) terrorism. Islamic terrorism is but a small, though important arm of the terrorist octopus. It is increasingly invisible due to its internal various structures, its flexibility, mobility and high degree of adaptation. It is anti-democratic and anti-globalization. Its network character makes it more difficult to fight and represents the main trend in terrorist groups’ evolution in the 21st century.

So now that I have established at least a minimum definition for this phenomenon, I will try to discover what lies beneath the concept of anti-terrorist war. What is it? What does it fight against? And what are its shortcomings?

2. The anti-terrorist war

I remember that after the tragic 9.11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington I read in the papers about what an important moment this day had become in history and how it would live in infamy for centuries to come. The world will never be the same again, everybody said, and little did they know how right they were. The world did change, and apparently not for the better. The 9.11 attacks caught the international community by surprise because they were not prepared for them and they had a far stronger impact on everybody because they challenged the US directly. Nothing like it had been seen since Pearl Harbor. International relations faced a new challenge in explaining these conflicts and their causes. Consequently, it changed, too. Not long after the Cold War ended, a war that came so close to destroying the world, we have engaged in another war… a very different one, one that would mark the beginning of a new type of conflicts. I do not like big words and it is not my intention to use them here either. But no one can deny the fact that change – which has not been met by timely theoretical adaptations – has deeply affected international relations in the last fifteen years. As Terriff puts it, theory is bound to be one step behind change.[90] What happened on 9.11 in the US has altered our perspective of the world and has helped define new priorities in international relations. Terrorism became the lead contender of the Western democratic model not on 9.11, but long before this day. However, this was the moment in which it was recognized as such.

On October 7^th 2001 an American military campaign was launched aiming to capture and bring before justice the people behind the 9.11 attacks. And it all unfolded from there. Soon enough a coalition was formed which offered military support to the injured party. This is how the anti-terrorist coalition was formed. President Bush declared that from 9.11 on America was in a state of war against terrorism as a whole and would not tolerate any more of those violent, barbarian attacks and that it would not rest until it saw all terrorism eradicated. The coalition declared war on terrorism, in response to Al Qaida’s declaration of war on the US. The new Bush Doctrine[91] acted as legal support for this new crusade the West embarked upon so voluntarily. This coalition can only be understood as a collective security coalition working on the basis of cooperation and complex interdependence.[92] It was formed under US leadership based on the Article 5 provisions, that says: if one member country is attacked the others must intervene and offer support.

As I have argued in the first chapter, terrorism is bi-dimensional as far as its power projection capabilities are concerned: international terrorism and local terrorism. International terrorism, however, cannot be fully understood outside a globalized world in which it functions and to which it opposes. Nor can the anti-terrorist war. Globalization is simultaneously the framework and the stake of this war. Depending on whom the winner is the world will evolve in one direction or another.

The US in the anti-terrorist war – a lead role. The Clinton administration’s legacy

When the Cold War ended and the USSR collapsed, “the US was left both unrivaled in terms of power and the undisputed ideological champion of the world. […] The United States (…) was now ‘the sole remaining superpower’ with the clear implication that its will would prevail in the new era. The only thing required was the appropriate ‘vision’ to inform the ‘global leadership’ that this status entailed.”[93] The end of history had arrived, Fukuyama claimed in the early 1990s, meaning that there was not gonna be any other ideological challenger to democracy and to the capitalist market which had achieved a universal status. The ideological confrontations had come to an end and the victory belonged to democracy, which made it universally compatible.[94] But “what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest,”[95] Huntington prophetically warned us at the time.

The US willingly assumed the role that it was being granted to it and developed the “vision” of the new harmonious, peaceful and secure world “which would be brought about more or less spontaneously by the spread of democracy, or the ineluctable logic of interdependence.”[96] In a world like this “the kind of leadership that would be required of the United States would be largely inspirational, educative, exemplary and supportive, not one involving too much in the way of cracking the whip and making hard, unpleasant decisions.”[97] Thus, based on the democratic peace theory[98] as it is known in international relations literature, and on globalization, the world was to become a safe place again. But something went terribly wrong. In 1993 the Clinton administration came to the White House and the disastrous foreign policy decisions and confused actions followed one after another, Harries argues. But we needn’t get all that dramatic. It was to be expected that at the end of a war which had drained the world of everything but its existence – and it came pretty close to doing that, too – the victorious party would impose a peaceful, harmonious vision of the world. This was everything the Cold War era was not. The Clinton administration, I believe, designed exactly the kind of picture-perfect world everybody expected. The problem with it, Harries says is that “the very notion of a vision-driven foreign policy, carrying the assumption of a grand end-state to be achieved […] is questionable.”[99] This was an inadequate foreign policy and it only led them to the inability to design a solid plan for international engagement, he concludes.[100]

But Kagan argues that there was really no choice to be made here. The very position of the US within the international system set the guiding lines for its foreign policy, which were naturally reinforced by the nature of the war which the world had just escaped from. Given the assertion that “the US is only capable of functioning abroad in two models, full on or full off,”[101] America didn’t really have a choice since it was the hegemonic power of the world. In fact, America could not exercise its position within the international system without such a vision-driven foreign policy, he indirectly argues. “Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power. […] they retain the hope for the perfectibility of the world. But they remain realists in the limited sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from perfection. Such laws as they may be to regulate international behaviour, they believe, exists because a power like the United States defends it by force of arms.”[102] In other words, its leading position put the pressure of responsibility on US shoulders; the US must inherently behave as if everyone’s business and problems are America’s too. Interventionism is not only motivated in this case, but is perfectly legitimate.

This kind of approach raised many problems throughout the 1990s. Interventionism[103] and unilateralism[104] is what the US was accused of, not only by the countries it inflicted them on – which considered them to be the ingredients of American imperialism – but by European countries, too. They brought up the question of national sovereignty and the right to self-determination.

The Clinton administration perceived clearly the fact that the 21^st century problems were structurally different from the ones of the Cold War period. This is the legacy of the Clinton administration: a vision-driven foreign policy, an inclination towards unilateral interventionism and its idealistic motivations – the spread of democracy, the human rights issue, and globalization (based on “certain basic values shared by humanity – respect for life, liberty, justice and equality, mutual respect, caring and integrity”[105]). These questions inflamed passions on both sides, the West and the non-democratic zone that felt threatened and perceived this international action taken by the Americans as an aggression directed at them. They felt under siege.[106]

The problem with this foreign policy is that it was badly conducted. American interests –whether state or private interests[107] – required that the US behave like the hegemonic power of the world since its interests were now global.[108] If the Cold War was over and the new world was to be constructed on democratic basis, then the chances for inter-state war were dropping. Traditional military threats[109] were thus less important, because “democracies do not engage in warfare with each other.”[110] However, a new type of conflicts was emerging, a type of conflicts that had domestic or local causes, that was long-lasting and due to its ideological or religious dimension pulled in third parties. These conflicts were introduced within a new category of threats, called asymmetric threats,[111] because they did not involve actors of the same kind (a state actor and a non-state actor). Terrorism was one such asymmetrical threat.[112] But, in the face of this new threat American doctrine remained clinged upon the old perceptions of conventional warfare. US officials believed that they could fight an unconventional enemy[113] and win because of the overwhelming American conventional warfare. They were still obsessed with a large-scale conventional conflict and so they took it to a whole new level, by a new military doctrine whose provisions stated America’s capacity to fight two different wars at the same time. The overwhelming American military power was supposed to represent a means of deterrence for any possible attacker, including terrorist organizations. At the end of the Cold War, the world was changing but conceptions of it were slow to follow. Thus, Harries argues, this demonstrates how dependent American officials continued to be on the Cold War state of affairs and the way security was understood; a large part of them were “more enamoured of their country’s role as a leader than they admitted – or perhaps realized.”[114]

I believe that Harries’ attitude towards the Clinton administration is more that critical and disproportionate. It is difficult to change people’s perceptions of the world, especially since they had just came out of a traumatic experience like the Cold War had been. Besides, the problem at the time was “the lack of coherent theories of change”[115] to validate new perspectives. This was the main problem in the Clinton administration’s case, too. On the other hand, its inability to construct a solid policy for international actions was limited by another constraint: the legitimacy of this type of unilateral interventionism, and the efforts they implicated.[116] Now that America had such a big part to play in the international system, its credibility could not be sacrificed. Nor could be sacrificed the legitimacy of the government.

At the time Europeans were very strongly opinionated about the human rights issue as well as the spread of democracy process and gave it their full support. But they accused America of being “too uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach”[117] of these goals, and “many Europeans began grumbling about the American propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.”[118] By imposing an outside humanitarian intervention, did the United States violate the respective state’s national sovereignty? Opinions were divided. Back in America “it sparked much hand wringing on the relative supremacy of human rights and national sovereignty.”[119] Meanwhile, back in Europe, the secretary-general of the UN, Perez de Cuellar, wrote in his annual report: “The principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity. We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights… What is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies.”[120] He, thus, emphasized that in a globalized, interdependent world cooperative collective measures in human rights crisis management, or in armed conflicts in general, were necessary for the security of one’s was no longer isolated from that of other countries.[121] Also, he indirectly rejected unilateralism and argued in favor of multilateralism.[122] European countries have long supported multilateral interventionism, especially if exercised through international organizations. Thus, tensions arose between the US and European countries from “the clash of those values that democratic countries cherish, such as the principle of state sovereignty and the notion of universal human rights.”[123] Kagan argues that this European inclination towards negotiation, cooperation, and peaceful solving propositions for major crisis and conflicts are due to European countries’ loss of military power. They are no longer relevant at a global scale, he suggests. The US is the one power that provides security for the whole of Europe, and allows the Europeans to develop their perfect interdependence system, based on cooperation, negotiation and the rule of law. What Europeans do not realize though, he argues, is that this system would have encountered many obstacles in its development if it hadn’t been for America’s providing security from outside.[124] He generally depicts the European powers as naïve, ungrateful states that do not recognize the importance of the US within the international system, but afford to criticize it. I believe that Mr. Kagan’s opinion is very patriotic and perhaps even motivated, but allow me to partially doubt it.

These are the general policy guidelines that have characterized American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. They have not changed over time, but their use in international relations by the current Bush administration has a different interpretation. They are value differently.

The Bush Doctrine – premises and consequences

The Bush security doctrine does not differ radically from the previous ones. Actually it incorporates many of the problems, risks and vulnerabilities also highlighted by the others, too. However, it cannot be denied that we are dealing with a change in international relations agenda that has been brought about by the Bush administration. But this change consists more of a reorganization of priorities, than of a radical, substantial change. What it is probably most important is that there is a special emphasis on the test of the legitimacy of a policy that lies both in its substance and the process by which it has been adopted.[125]

First of all, the Bush Doctrine consists of a diplomatic and military strategy that has been building permanently since Bush’s presidential campaign. But it became complete only after the tragic terrorist attacks of 9.11.2001. The speech George W. Bush gave on September 20^th 2001 in front of the US Congress shaped and completed the Bush Doctrine, by setting the strategic principles of American foreign policy.

America was setting on a long-lasting campaign against international terrorism, by assuming a global war against this dangerous enemy: “Americans mustn’t expect a single battle, but a long-lasting campaign, longer than any other known so far.”[126] The campaign was bi-dimensional: both domestic and global, as the war was going to be fought simultaneously on an internal front and an external one. Within the country security measures would be increased significantly. The Congress adopted a lot of new laws after the tragic 9.11 events that have strengthened state authority, its internal control and its interference within citizens’ private lives. Bill like Patriot Act for example, or the bill which introduced a new state department, Homeland Defense Office (which is in charge of prevention of terrorist attacks on US soil, of countermeasures against terrorist organizations and possible attacks), were adopted on the spur of the moment, under the negative influence of the recent events. These laws granted the state in general and the president in particular a great amount of power.[127] Nowadays the president of the United States has more power in his hands than any other president has ever had so far. The Patriot Act has allowed him to control all the secret services and intellicenge agencies in the country. Moreover, by launching this worldwide campaign it has gained major military decision-making privileges, which were strictly censored by the Senate before. In the face of danger, the freest nation of the world started to enclose upon itself. Security became a priority while democratic rights and liberties fell on the second position: “Le 11 September 2001 a marqué en matière de respect de droits humains une rupture nette. Au nome de la «juste guerre» contre le terrorisme, beaucoup de transgressions ont soudain été permises. […] des valeurs hier encore qualifiées de «fondamentales» quittent la scène politique tandis que des Etats démocratiques sombrent, du point de vue du droit, dans une régression.”[128] But, American officials consider these measures to be vital. Senator Trent Lott considers that one must interpret civil liberties differently in times of war, while Judge Sandra Day O’Conner, one of the judges within the Supreme Court of Justice, warns that America is faced with the important and large restrictions of civil liberties in history.[129] Well silly us, for believing that there is only one general interpretation of these rights and liberties – they are or they are not. Fear has caused American society to run for cover and hide behind more radical, authoritarian laws, that restrict democratic liberties and rights. The Patriot Act, for example, is one of the most non-democratic laws ever adopted by the US Congress; “elle permet aux autorités d’arrêter de suspects pour un temps quasi indéfini, de les déporter, de les faire incancérer dans des cellules d’isolement, de faire surveiller leur courrier, leur conversations téléphoniques, leur communications via Internet [avec l’aide de programme Carnivore], et de faire fouiller leur domicile sans autorisation judiciaire…”[130]

Moreover, it is not the only one. On November 13^th 2001, the US president decided to create military courts of justice, or tribunals that would operate through special procedures in judging and convicting foreign citizens of terrorism against the United States; these special military tribunals had the possibility to sentence the accused to death penalty. Their sentencies were to be kept secret.[131] A couple of days later, the president abrogated a 1974 decision which prohibited CIA to assassinate foreign leaders, thus allowing them to take all necessary actions to physically eliminate Al Qaida leaders and members if they refused to surrender.[132] This was one of the major characteristics of the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, too. The motivations, White House spokesman says, are genuine and legitimate: “The purpose is to shape a more secure world. From this point of view we must be informed about the risk represented by immigrants that might enter our country one day.”[133] Even such constitutional rights as the freedom of press, of opinion are no longer respected. There is a strong censorship over “sensitive information” as the American officials call it and over press materials that present terrorist attacks or organizations. “L”acte de censure le plus remarkable a été, au moment de la guerre de Afghanistan, la demande adressée par la Maison Blanche aux cinq grandes chaines de télévision de ne pas diffuser les déclarations de M. Oussama Ben Laden et de ses associés. Leurs messages, ont expliqué les autorités, contenaient des codes secrets. En outre, ont-elle ajouté, la Maison Blanche ne voulait pas qu’une propagande appelant à l’assassinat d’Américains soit rendue publique.”[134]

Besides these seriously damaging bills, there are a few others just like these that expect to be passed by the US Congress by June 2004 the latest, e.g. The Domestic Security Enhancement Act, The Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, to name but a few. Moreover, air traffic security measures are reinforced. “Together we will enhance air traffic security measure and we will significantly increase the number of under-cover agents on internal flights. Together we will have knowledge of terrorists attack plans before they have the chance to carry them out.”[135] In December 2003 the US ordered more agents to be infiltrated on board of national and international flights and many international flights were canceled for fear of possible terrorist attacks. At the same time, the terrorist alert level went up to orange, where it remained until the present day.

It seems to me as if the American society could collapse under the pressure of these loads, or it could suffer greatly from its effects. Limitation of civil liberties is not a viable solution to this conflict in which America was dragged on 9.11. Hopefully, the Congress will not fail to regain its balance after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and seek to reestablish the balance, the democratic equilibrium between its atributions and powers and the president’s, based on the constitutional principle of separation of state powers.

The consequences of this type of regulatory legislation should become even more worrying as they are now being imported into European countries, too.[136] This way, instead of trying to maintain their openness, they become more and more obsessed with security.

The other dimension of the Bush Doctrine is the external anti-terrorist campaign, which aims at completely eradicating terrorism. “We will focus and direct all our resources towards this end, every diplomatic strategy, every financial influence, every genius mind and every necessary weapon to destroy the global terrorist network will be used.”[137] The war is fought on two fronts simultaneously: against the global terrorist network on the one hand, and against states that harbor, encourage and offer financial and military to terrorist organizations – “Every country of every region now has to make a decision. You’re either on our side, or on the terrorists’ side. From this moment on, any country that continues to harbor or support terrorists will be considered by the United States as a hostile regime.”[138] The world is thus divided into two camps: freedom, security and democracy versus terror, coercion and “slavery” (the lack of freedom). This is the central principle within the Bush Doctrine of the two axes: the evil axis and the good axis. This principle resembles Buzan’s “two worlds model.”[139] Buzan argues that the world is divided into two zones: a zone of peace, which is the democratic zone, and a zone of conflict, which identifies with the non-democratic zone.[140] “In a ‘two worlds’ international system which is only partly liberalized, and still partly realist, the liberal commitment to absolute gains and change produces some difficult dilemmas. […] that might be called the liberal-realist dilemma.”[141] These two zones function within the international system according to two different paradigms: the zone peace assumes a liberal approach of the IR while the zone of conflict assumes a realist one. Thus the security problem is born out of their relation to each other, “for they do relate to each other in many and significant ways.”[142] But the most important problem is by far that of liberalism as a major paradigm in IR that is essentially an imperialist ideology “dedicated to converting the world and believing that its virtue gives it the moral right to claim the future.”[143] This, Buzan argues, is due to the fact that “the natural, organic dynamics of a liberal order tend to make it expansionist and that this carries dangers” because liberalism is dependent on change, it can other change permanently or lose its legitimacy. In the face of danger posed by the ‘zone of conflict’ the ‘zone of peace’ acts preventively, it will “engage in deliberate and forceful expansion in order to secure (and expand) the ‘zone of democratic peace.’ In short, there is a possibility that the modern liberal states (…) will become messianic liberal interventionists.”[144]

It is my belief that this exactly what the anti-terrorist campaign has become. The US is trying to maximize its national security, along with the international security (within the zone of peace) through messianic liberal interventionism, which comes from its vision-driven foreign policy, and mission-driven role in the international system, as well as from its capability to project its military conventional power anywhere in the world. As the hegemonic power of the international system, the US is taking responsibility for this anti-terrorist campaign for two main reasons: on the one hand, because it represents the prime target of international terrorism, and on the other hand, because it is trying to avoid to bring the war at home.[145] It is better is this war is fought far away from home and not on American soil. Consequently, the Bush Doctrine establishes that Americans are not going to expect the terrorists to strike America’s homeland again, but rather that they would go out and hunt terrorists down. Thus, a unilateral, interventionist perspective upon this campaign is established. Defense now means that the security problem be destroyed from the source, and as soon as possible, before it produces more damage. And at the same time, that the construction of a new democratic, globalized and interdependent world cannot wait for the spontaneous spread of democracy; this process needs to be sustained by a superpower, i.e. the US. It looks as though America is running out of patience waiting for the world it dreams of. So, no more patience, no more tolerance and no more delays, now is the time to take action. One must produce defense through offensive means. When accused of using double standards, this argument of the two worlds comes in handy to American policy makers. As Kagan underlines, Americans don’t want to use double standards in international relations, but they have no way of avoiding it either, due to the system’s two worlds model: “The challenge of the postmodern world (…) is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves [democratic countries] may operate on the basis of law and open cooperative security. But when dealing with the world outside [the zone of peace], we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, preemptive attack, and deception, whatever is necessary. […] Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”[146] (And this is how the terrorist argument of double standards and aggression is formed).

This model of the “two worlds” in Buzan’s opinion, or of “the two axes” in Bush’s interpretation, should be considered in relation to another doctrine, The Rogue State Doctrine[147], that is very important, too, and only a little older that the first one (as they both originated in the early 1990s). In 1994, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, defined the doctrine: “Our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of nations] but also assault its basic values. These states exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world, as demonstrated most clearly by their support of terrorism and pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons. Just as the United States once took the leadership in “containing” the Soviet Union, it now bears a special responsibility to neutralize and contain the band of outlaw states.”[148] Thus, the US has taken upon itself to stop these “rogue states”[149] not only from proliferating mass destruction weapons, but from supporting terrorism as well.

From this point of view, the Bush Doctrine is radical and intolerant in its defensive mission. It refuses any negotiation or dialogue of any kind with terrorist organization, or at least so they say (although the fact that they are forcing suspects or prisoners to collaborate and give them strategic information, it seems to me like a form of negotiation and dialogue). On the other hand, it is total and global – it takes upon itself to eradicate the global terrorist network for good; and at the same time, to take action anywhere in the world where this global terrorist network operates and against any state that supports terrorism. These characteristics, however, raise a lot of interpretation problems. First of all, what is the global terrorist network? Second, what does this expanded campaign involves? And last but not least, how will victory look like? I am not as much concerned with the chances for victory for I believe the chances are on our side (although I don’t find victory to be complete or permanent in this particular case), as I am with the appearance of the international system at the end of this campaign.

This position of the US within the international system, argues Kagan, makes it perceive threats to international security more easily that other countries of the system, i.e. European countries, because the US has both the intention, the will, and the capacity to face them and solve them. “Americans tend to seek finality in international relations: they want problems solved, threats eliminated.”[150] And America perceives terrorism as an international security threat. Terrorism is a threat to the Western democratic society, to its values and principles and to its very existence. This is the reason why it is so important and so urgent that something be done to eradicate terrorism. But what does America, i.e. American officials and academics understand by terrorism. What is the global terrorist network they want to destroy so badly? If war must be, that war it is, but against whom?

The problem here is merely one of perception, it really is. It is not that somebody is right and the other is wrong (it feels like each of us are on the rightside of wrong anyway), it is a problem of perception between Europe and the US. For the American government, this war is not a war against the terrorist phenomenon as a whole as the goal that president Bush so patriotically set for himself suggests it. It is a war against Al Qaida.[151] To America, Al Qaida is the challenger, the enemy, and not the whole terrorist phenomenon. All the actions that have been taken so far in this anti-terrorist campaign hunted down Al Qaida members, not IRA or ETA members. The anti-terrorist war is thus not a total war, but in its strictly territorial meaning. For example, the war in Afghanistan was directed at capturing Bin Laden and its “lieutenants”, its associates and at changing the Taliban regime that offered them support. The war in Iraq was directed at changing the Saddam Hussein regime because it collaborated broadly with Al Qaida, as well as other terrorist organizations and at capturing Saddam Hussein itself. Make no mistake; capturing Saddam Hussein was a big victory for the Americans, first of all as a means of deterrence. In the previous chapter, I was talking about the role of media as a propagator of the terrorist message, and as an agent that renders terrorism so efficient. But the same principle works in the case of the anti-terrorist war, too. The televised war, as I like to call the war in Iraq, is mainly a means of deterrence for other rogue states that make the subjects of US security concerns. The same principle was adopted by the Americans, too – to inflict insecurity and uncertainty, but not upon civilians (or at least not upon them directly) but upon the hostile governments of the respective rogue states. And the method to do that has became the frogleap, selective engagement.[152] There is a certain uncertainty about the next target the US will choose in its anti-terrorist campaign, and this works as a major threat to rogue states governments – and unfortunately, but deliberately to rogue states citizens, too. The frogleap engagement is thus, in a certain way, the reverse of the multiplicity and diversity of targets principle that works in case of terrorist organizations. And from this perspective, it is important that the US maintain their military conventional power and their Cold War scale military apparatus (even though this means sacrificing important amounts of money that need to be cut down from education, health, agriculture, etc as the White House spokesman recently announced). From this point of view, military force remains important to at least some aspects of the international relations and to American foreign policy. “The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps, but widely-welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun.”[153] Fighting an invisible enemy takes a lot of time, and consequently even a lot more money. But this king of deterrence method could hurry the end by leaving terrorist cells vulnerable and with no place to hide, with no state to harbor and support them, which would really make the coalition'’ job a lot more easier.

So, in conclusion…

The main problem of the world today is concepts, incomplete, ambiguous concepts. Terrorism, as we have seen, is one such concept. And the lack of clear definition of this concept, the anti-terrorist led by the US is misunderstood and taken for a global war. It is true it has a universal claim, but it is not total, except for its territorial dimension perhaps. And that is still a probability. For now, it isn’t at all global – it is centered on the Middle East area. On the other hand, it is not a total war because it does not fight the terrorist phenomenon as a whole, but Al Qaida, as an expression of international terrorism. Thus, we should not make the mistake to define it wrongly for this could profoundly affect its development and its consequences. How? The lack of clear definition of the terrorist phenomenon could lead the anti-terrorist coalition in two wrong directions. On the one hand, it could cause them to limit their perception of the enemy and thus fight only one arm of the terrorist octopus. This is a clear example of the U.S anti-terrorist war pointed at destroying Al Qaida as their main enemy and capturing its most important members. Victory against Al Qaida, although possible, is not a total, permanent victory, for there are thousands of other terrorrist organizations that could foolow in its footseps. Consequently the world would not be any safer than it is today. On the other hand, it could cause them to have too broad a perception of their enemy – i.e. the terrorist phenomenon itself – which also leads them to an even greater misdirection of their force. In this particular case, the misdirection comes from a disregard of the differences between terrorist organizations in different parts of the world and the objectives they pursue. Thus no difference is made between Islamic terrorist organizations, and other organizations such as Irish Republic Army (IRA), Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Accolta Natiunale Corsa (ANC) to name but a few, which hold a more nationalist or perhaps secessionist dimension. But most importantly, this misdirection comes from the possibility to identify liberation movements, violent political or religious minorities or other types of organizations (human rights organizations, environmental organizations, etc.) as being terrorist in essence. Way too enthusiastic about this war and the promise of a war without terrorism, serious abuses could appear, which could affect the essence of the democratic values the West is so keen on preeching to the rest. Besides, this great diversity of targets brings about another important issue. The large quantity of information and number of targeted terrorist organizations requires an effort of selection and a focus of attention on one set of priorities. Not to mention highly-qualified forces to oppose them. However, from this second point of view it would not be wrong to define the anti-terrorist war as global and total. It is a war againts an invisible enemy, it is an invisible war because it is a war against a phenomenon. This is the most important change in the theory of war that has been brought about by 9.11.

The main issues here is practically the two sides’ vision of the world, and of the human being and its role and value within the world. The main conflict between them, in terms of ideologies and values of course, begins here: humanism and respect for the human being and its rights and liberties versus disregard for humanism, for the human being and its rights. And it all unfolds from here.

Ideologically opposed, the enemies in this war are actually trying to undermine each other. And since there is no room for both of them in a world already to small to fit so many the problem is viewed through another perspective: the very survival of the parties and their systems. From this point of view, I argue that this war is ultimately a confrontation for power. We must not be quick in dismissing this perspective, because it is true. The 9.11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington marked the beginning of a confrontation for power at regional level, between terrorist organizations that ultimately want to cease power within certain states and thus benefit from it, and the US, which claims hegemonic influence over the respective region. This is the case of the Middle East and the war against Al Qaida, too. Our war is with Al Qaida and the international terrorism, not with the whole terrorist phenomenon. But its definition as such could profoundly alter our perception of victory. Besides, a more important question arises. Since America is fighting Al Qaida out of a sense of revenge and justice combined, what will happen when Al Qaida is brought down? Now America argues there is no justification for terrorism, there must be no tolerance either. But will this enthusiasm survive after the US thirst for justice and revenge is satisfied?

In this confrontation, Western democracy system’s task is twofold. On the one hand, it has to make the world safe again (or at least as safe as it was before the 9.11 attacks). But this goal is not being achieved so far, since the frequency of terrorist attacks around the world has multiplied significantly since the 9.11. And on the other hand, it must try to maintain its openness, and at the same time fight that danger that hangs over its head. And this goal fails to be achieved, too, at least as far, since modern democratic societies have become obsessed with security, which they prefer over their openness. In this case it seems to me that we still have a long way to go and that if we don’t try to maintain our system clean and opened as it was before, terrorism will have already had its first major victory, despite the number of terrorist leaders we capture and trail.

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37.  Also see: www.irlnet.com www.euskadi.com www.pkk.org